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REPUBLICANS, BULL MOOSE, AND NEGROES
IN FLORIDA, 1912
by G. N. G REEN
weeks of 1912, President William Howard Taft became ruefully aware that a former White House
occupant, Theodore Roosevelt, would be his major opponent when
the Republican Party held its presidential nominating convention
at Chicago in June. Taft’s political aides were scouring the southern states, searching out Roosevelt Republican office-holders and
dismissing them whenever found. Local postmasters were advised
that if they did not bring a pro-Taft delegation to their state convention, they would no longer be deemed available for reappointment. Another Taft strategem was to hold the southern state
conventions ahead of the usual time and before the Roosevelt men
could organize. For awhile Roosevelt Republicans remained
hopeful over the possibility that many job-conscious Republicans
would support their candidate, since he was so widely regarded
as “the only Republican who could win.” In January and February 1912, Roosevelt organizers throughout the South were led
by Ormsby McHarg, a New York attorney who has been described
as a “hard-bitten, experienced, practical politician.” He attempted
by various means to bring these men into the Roosevelt camp.
On February 6, however, it became obvious that McHarg’s
tactics were not succeeding. On that date Florida Republicans
held their state convention in Palatka, and, although the convention collapsed even before it was completely organized, a ten-man
Taft delegation was selected to represent Florida at the Republican national convention. 1
Joe Lee, Negro customs collector of Jacksonville and chairman of the Florida Republican convention, apparently tried to
settle the many contested delegations by giving tickets to the convention hall only to Taft men, refusing to admit delegates “withURING THE EARLY

1. Florida had twelve delegate seats, although considering the meagre
10,654 votes for Taft in 1908, Florida merited only one seat.
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out tickets,” and then revoking the qualifications of the Roosevelt
men because they were not present. The selection of a ten-man
Taft delegation to represent Florida at the Republican national
convention in Chicago was rammed through the Palatka meeting,
with the strong support of the Postmaster’s Protective Association. 2 Lee’s rulings evoked a storm of protest, and over half
of the delegates, including many Negroes, walked out of the
meeting. The secession faction convened elsewhere and enthusiastically elected a slate of delegates to the national convention
pledged to Roosevelt. They also nominated pro-Roosevelt men
to run for various state offices. Roosevelt, who “happened” to
be in Miami at the time, was informed by telegram of the events
taking place in Palatka, and presumably he gave his approval.
His presence in Florida would seem to indicate that he was
certainly in touch with the Roosevelt people on the state level
and there were many who believed that he was the mastermind
behind this action from the beginning. 3
The regular Republican state convention, consisting mostly
of whites, continued on with its work after the Roosevelt delegates bolted, selecting a full state ticket. Fearful that these steamroller tactics in Florida would be duplicated in the rest of the
South, Roosevelt and Ormsby McHarg agreed that their organization would attempt to contest all southern Republican conventions that named Taft delegations.
After Roosevelt formally announced in late February 1912,
that his “hat was in the ring” and that he was available for the
Republican nomination, his Florida supporters apparently felt
that their rump convention in Palatka was too obviously an illegal
affair, and that it could be branded a revolt by men who sought
not principle, but patronage. After conferring with McHarg in
mid-April, Roosevelt’s supporters in Florida announced again
their repudiation of the Republican convention in Palatka and
2. Half of the Florida Republican central committee were postmasters.
T h e c e n t r a l c o m m i t t e e s u p p o s e d l y r u l e d F l o r i d a ’s 1 0 , 0 0 0 o r s o
Republicans with an iron hand. It tolerated Negroes, if they did
as they were told. Joe Lee, though, with his Washington connections
and excellent work both as postmaster and parliamentarian, was so
powerful that the postmasters were a bit afraid of him. Lee controlled Florida’s Negro Republican factions. Daytona Beach NewsGazette, March 23, 1912.
3. Ibid.; New York Times, February 7, 1912; Jacksonville Florida
Times-Union, February 7, 1912.
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issued a call for another state convention. The Roosevelt Republicans proclaimed that the dictation and rule of the officeholders’
trust had become intolerable, that it was now time for what they
called the Republican “masses” of Florida to take things into
their own hands. 4
The convention met in Jacksonville on May 18 in the Odd
Fellows’ Hall. Once again the Roosevelt enthusiasts selected delegates to the Republican national convention and candidates for
the state ticket. The convention also excoriated Taft for appointing a Democrat to a Federal judgeship in Florida, for favoring
the Catholic Church whenever he had a chance, and for not
agreeing to enter a presidential primary in Florida. The leading
white Roosevelt Republicans were W. O. Hodges, the convention’s gubernatorial candidate, and H. L. Anderson, a Jacksonville
attorney. This Jacksonville convention of bolting Republicans was
in turn bolted by a group of Negroes led by C. H. Alston, a
Negro lawyer from Tampa, who claimed that the white Roosevelt
Republicans were discriminating against Negroes. 5
The Republican national convention was scheduled to open
in Chicago on June 18. Several days earlier, the party’s powerful national committee assembled in that city to decide whether
Taft or Roosevelt men were entitled to the 254 delegate seats
which were in dispute. On June 9, the committee held hearings in which the three contesting Florida Republican delegations flailed away at one another. C. H. Alston led the Roosevelt Negro delegation; W. C. Hodges and H. L. Anderson, the
“lily-white” Roosevelt delegation; and Joe Lee and Henry Chubb,
the Taft delegation. Chubb was national committeeman from
Florida and chairman of the Republican Party in Florida at the
time. 6
Ormsby McHarg accurately summed up the status of Republicanism in Florida at the time when he noted, “There is no
Republican Party in Florida, for all the great number of delegations.” 7 Alston, however, captured the most attention at the
hearing. When he tried to join the Jacksonville convention, he
said, “One of the men wheeled on me and I wheeled on him
4.
5.
6.
7.

Tampa Morning Tribune,
Ibid., May 19, 1912.
Ibid., June 9, 1912.
Ibid.
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and then they wheeled me out.” He secured a ticket from
one of the delegates and sneaked back in, hiding in the rear
of the hall, but he was discovered again and forcibly evicted.
Alston continued, amidst the national committee’s roar of
laughter, “I kept my ticket and brought it here and filed it with
your secretary.” 8
Joe Lee admonished both Roosevelt delegations and warned
that Florida would be better off if “outside leaders” like McHarg
ceased organizing. McHarg countered that conventions of Florida
Republicans were hardly more than private meetings of Federal
officeholders, and that Republican slates were announced only
after securing promises of Federal patronage. When a committeeman pointed out, “Everyone knows there is no use in putting out
a ticket then,” McHarg retorted, “Well, then, you frankly admit
there is none. You might as well also admit there was no regularity in the election of the Taft delegates.” 9 Joe Lee could not answer McHarg’s charge, but he did assert that “if there was no
Republican Party in Florida for us, there could have been none
for Roosevelt.” 10
The national committee awarded 235 seats to Taft and
nineteen to Roosevelt. One observer, vainly trying to get the floor,
insisted that no one would be recognized “but a hand-picked,
machine-made crook.” 11 Fistfighting among the delegates and
prospective delegates almost broke up several meetings. Although
the national committee included some twenty Roosevelt Republicans, it voted unanimously against almost every Roosevelt delegation from the southern states. The Taft delegation from Florida
was upheld 44-0. Apparently, Roosevelt had decided not to continue the battle of contesting the delegations from the South.
Frank Munsey, millionaire newspaper publisher and chief financial supporter of Roosevelt, explained that challenging the Taft
delegations from the South would force a tabulation of delegate support which would show the country Roosevelt’s great
strength. The contests were thus for early grass-roots psychological effect, a play of practical politics, and were not to be seriously
fought for at the showdown in Chicago. 12
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Victor Rosewater, Backstage in 1912 (Philadelphia, 1932), 130.
“Delegate Contests at Chicago,” Independent, LXXII (June 20, 1912),
1386-1387.
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Perhaps the American public, which had been given to understand that all Roosevelt’s claims were valid, was startled to
hear that Roosevelt’s own men on the national committee voted
to seat Taft men, not only from Florida but from some other
contested states as well. But there were no charges of “sell out”
directed at Roosevelt by his Florida supporters because they believed that Roosevelt was going to repudiate the Republican national convention and establish a third party throughout the nation - as, in fact, he tried to do. And they probably assumed that
if by chance Roosevelt did capture the Republican nomination
and win in November, he would withdraw federal patronage from
the Taft machine in Florida and reward the original Roosevelt
men.
Of course, the approved Florida delegation to the Republican
national convention voted for Taft and for all the Taft resolutions. Chubb and Lee enthusiastically applauded the distinguished
senator from Ohio, Warren G. Harding, when he described Taft
in his nominating speech as an “inspiring personification of courage.” 13 Chubb, in fact, called the Republican convention “the
greatest political event in the history of the party.” 14 The 1912
Republican platform endorsed conservative principles. It called
for a furthering of the conservation program and a stricter enforcement of anti-trust legislation, but it contained little else of
a positive nature.
After Roosevelt walked out of the Republican Party and announced his willingness to accept the presidential nomination
of the new Progressive Party, his southern supporters, as elsewhere in the country, began marshalling their forces. Alston’s
Negro faction and Anderson’s whites joined Roosevelt’s third
party. Concerning racial questions, each state had been advised
to follow whatever local formula would be “best designed for
party success.” Roosevelt urged that northern Progressive leaders
bring a few Negroes to the Progressive national convention
which was scheduled to meet at Chicago in August. He knew,
however, that southern Progressives, if they expected any votes,
would have to disavow Negro support. Certainly there was little
13. Proceedings of the Republican National Convention, 1912 (Chicago,
1912), 378.
14. Jacksonville Florida Times-Union, July 4, 1912.
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reason for southern Progressives to court the Negro vote, since
very few Negroes voted in 1912, in the South. Although the
“Roosevelt Georgia White League” had refused to admit Negroes
into their convention hall, they were disturbed that Negroes had
held their own convention and had selected a Negro Georgia
delegation to send to the Progressive assembly in Chicago. 15
H. L. Anderson, now the Progressive national committeeman
for Florida, was anxious to avoid an embarrassing racial contest
such as that besetting Georgia Progressives, so he prudently organized two conventions, one black and one white. Most of Florida’s Negro voters, however, were not aware - and Anderson
certainly would not be the one to inform them - that their convention would meet over a hundred miles away from the white
meeting and being so inconveniently placed, it would have no
real voice in the selection of delegates to the national meeting.
Thirty-five Negroes, most of whom were probably hired by Anderson, convened in St. Augustine on July 26. Without protest, they
pledged support to the white Progressive state and national ticket.
One of the delegates at St. Augustine was, incredibly, C. H.
Alston, who had heretofore battled the white faction. 16
Florida’s white Progressive Party was launched in Ocala,
July 27. The convention elected delegates to the national convention, candidates for state offices, and adopted two resolutions:
a pledge that the Progressive Party would appoint no one but
Caucasians to party committees or Federal offices in Florida; and,
a polemic accusing President Taft of various unpatriotic sins.
Taft had selected John Cheney as Federal district judge of the
southern district of Florida, allegedly as a political favor to loyal
Henry Chubb and Joe Lee. 17 H. L. Anderson denounced this
appointment in the bluntest language: “The President of the
United States has paid a dirty miserable debt to a lot of conscienceless grafters headed by a Negro as black as your hat by appointing as a successor to the venerable and beloved James W.
Locke a man whose only claim to the high office of U. S. Judge is
that Joe Lee helped steal a nomination for this fat fool. The
15. George Mowry, “The South and Progressive Lily White Party of
1912,” Journal of Southern History, VI (May, 1940), 239-240.
16. Ibid., 240.
17. Jacksonville Florida Times-Union, July 27, 1912.
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infamy of it. . . . By God I will speak out: this act of William
Howard Taft is as infamous as hell.” 18
Anderson made a more important announcement earlier in
the day when he decreed that Negroes would not be allowed to
participate in the Progressive white convention. Police officials in
Ocala feared trouble, since many Negroes, who had expected to
take part in the proceedings, were present. They were forced to
move into the galleries to watch as spectators. During the afternoon session, C. H. Alston, who had made a quick trip in from St.
Augustine, led a charge of Negro politicians onto the floor, but
they were quickly repulsed and were also confined to the gallery.
The white delegates complained that some of the attackers (omitting Alston’s name) were in the pay of Chubb’s Republicans,
and insisted that Negro Progressives had no cause for resentment,
since they had already held their own convention at St. Augustine. Then, H. C. Groves, a white Ocala man who was the spokesman for Negro factions in the area, moved to allow his followers
to be seated on the convention floor. His motion was seconded,
but before a vote could be taken it was ruled out of order. Alston
tried again to come onto the convention floor, but he was blocked
once more, and when quiet was restored, Anderson outlined the
Florida Progressive platform. The white delegates on the floor
and the segregated Negroes in the gallery listened as Anderson
called for a lower tariff, total restriction of immigration, and the
elimination of class distinctions and bigotry. 19
Later that afternoon, a large group of Negroes in Ocala, led
by Alston, announced their repudiation of both the white Progressive convention and the rigged Negro one in St. Augustine,
and formed a Progressive coalition of their own. A full slate of
candidates for state offices and delegates to the national convention was elected. 20 This marked the sixth state convention
committed to Roosevelt that had been organized in less than six
months.
The following day, July 28, H. L. Anderson came out in
opposition to the Ocala Negro convention, stating that the Republican experience during the past thirty years showed the im18. Ibid.,
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid.

July

28,

1912.
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possibility of maintaining a strong party based on a division of
offices among white and Negro. It was much better for both Negroes and whites, he insisted, to have two white parties in Florida, the Democratic and the Progressive. 21
Anderson’s segregationist tactics fared no better in Florida,
though than those of the Roosevelt Georgia White League. Negroes, moreover, in Alabama and Mississippi also held rebel Progressive conventions, and not only selected delegates, but sent
them to the opening meeting of the Progressive national committee in Chicago, August 3. With delegates present representing
these four southern states, Roosevelt was publicly faced with
a bothersome and embarrassing race question. 22 Roosevelt thereupon released for publication a letter he had written to Julian
Harris, son of Joel Chandler Harris and an ardent Roosevelt
supporter in the South, that was designed to influence the deliberations of the national committee. According to Roosevelt, the
North and South had different race problems. Many Northern
Negroes were educated, he wrote, and because of their long history of free political action, they should be included in northern
delegations. On the other hand, southern Negroes were politically
corrupted and should be excluded. Thus, the former President
of the United States upheld white supremacy in the South and
appealed only to “the best white men in the south.” 23
On August 4, the Progressive national committee began to
hear testimony in the case of Florida’s rival delegations. The
latter were the most vehement among the three contested states.
H. L. Anderson admitted that he had barred Negroes from the
white convention. 24 The Negro leader, Alston, making his second
trip that summer to Chicago, and, also testifying for the second
time before a national party convention in regard to Florida
politics, described his efforts of July 27 to get onto the floor of

21. Ibid., July 29, 1912.
22. Mowry, “The South and the Progressive Lily White Party of 1912,”
240. The Negro “lily-white” delegates (if such description can be
made) who were chosen in St. Augustine on July 26, apparently
had no further role assigned them in the campaign. They are not
mentioned in the accounts of the National Progressive convention.
23. Elting E. Morison (ed.), The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt (Cambridge, 1954), VII, 584-590.
24. Jacksonville Florida Times-Union, August 4, 1912.
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the Ocala meeting: “Mr. Anderson met me at the door and said,
‘There is not going to be a nigger in this convention’.” 25
Anderson challenged this statement and urged Alston to
confine himself to “the facts.” Alston replied that this was what
he was doing and that if he failed in this effort he “would beg the
forgiveness of his God.” Alston reminded the committee that he
had participated in national conventions for sixteen years, and
he had never seen Anderson present. He insisted that he only
wanted to work for Roosevelt whom he loved and admired. He
claimed that there were less than 200 white Republicans in Florida, and said that this was because the corrupt Republican machine and its leader, Customs Collector Joe Lee, only wanted
enough Republicans to hold the Federal offices. 26
United States Senator Joseph Dixon of Montana, provisional
chairman of the committee, then asked if the lack of white Republicans in Florida was because they were reluctant to follow
the leadership of Negroes. Alston insisted that Florida Negroes
did not want “to lead” anybody, they merely wished to follow.
“We are not ward politicians,” he added. “We came up here in
a chartered Pullman and we won’t have to walk back. We are
all men of means. One of our colored delegates is worth $250,000, and there is hardly one among us who is not worth
$50,000.” 27
Although several committeemen heckled Alston and asked
him badgering questions during the hearing, he seems to have
made a good impression upon others present. E. F. Tuttle, national committeeman from Rhode Island, protested against any
attempts at discrimination against southern Negro delegates,
which then blocked the certain casting aside of these Negroes.
The chairman hastily called a recess and wired Roosevelt in New
York, hoping to obtain some concessions for the Negro claimants.
Obviously, a total shutout of southern Negroes from the Progressive convention might cost the former president many votes
from northern Negroes and Negro sympathizers. Roosevelt,
nonetheless, held firm to his position as he had stated it in the
letter to Julian Harris, and reiterated his support of the “lilywhite” position in the South. 28
25. New York Times, August 4, 1912.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid.
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For the next two days the national committee dallied and
debated, then announced a compromise for the four contested
delegations. The “lily-white” delegates were to be seated; Negroes were to attend and sit in as supplemental delegates. The
Negroes immediately denounced the decision. “If we attend the
convention merely as spectators,” Alston remarked, “we prefer to
buy our own tickets.” The five Florida Negro delegates stripped
the Roosevelt badges from their lapels and together with the Negro delegations from Mississippi and Alabama, held an indignation meeting. White southerners, led by Julian Harris and H. L.
Anderson, also objected to the compromise. The committee,
either questioning the regularity of Anderson’s calling a white
and a Negro convention separately, or following Anderson’s suggestion that he would rather see both delegations barred than
to allow a Florida Negro onto the convention floor, decided to
unseat the white delegates from Georgia and Florida. The white
delegates from Alabama and Mississippi were approved. Thus,
for a few hours, Florida went totally unrepresented in the Progressive national convention. After more debate and the personal intervention of Roosevelt, however, the southern whites
accepted a solution that guaranteed white supremacy without
actually stating it. 29
Some Progressives charged that President Taft had manipulated the activities of southern Negro delegates at the Progressive
convention and had defrayed their traveling expenses to Chicago.
All Negroes involved, however, hotly denied this. 30 Certainly
Alston’s militant deeds often played into the hands of the Taft
Republicans, especially on the two occasions when he disrupted
“regular” Roosevelt conventions in Florida. Just what his presence
at the St. Augustine convention connoted is a mystery. He may
not have known it was rigged until he got there. He may have
been so enraptured with Theodore Roosevelt’s candidacy that he
was willing to tolerate a “lily-white” organization, until it actually
barred him from its doors in Ocala. He may have been, as Joe
Lee apparently was, selling out his race for a fee; or, perhaps,
he was following some other line of reasoning known only to
29. Jacksonville Florida Times-Union, August 6, 7, 1912; Mowry, “The
South and the Progressive Lily White Party of 1912,” 243-244.
30. Jacksonville Florida Times-Union, August 6, 1912.
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Negroes in public life during an era when Negroes had many
detractors and few sympathizers, South or North.
It is interesting that H. L. Anderson never charged Alston
with being a pawn of Taft. Anderson and Alston were men
of different races working in different ways toward separate ends;
they had been personally hostile toward one another for a long
time. When Alston switched his support it was not to Taft, but
to Woodrow Wilson and the Democratic party - the party traditionally most devoted to state rights and white supremacy. 31
Wilson received 36,417 votes in Florida, and the Democrats
carried every county in the state. With the Republican vote split,
the Socialist Party candidate, Eugene V. Debs, ran second in
Florida with 4,806 votes. Roosevelt was third with 4,535, and
Taft was low man with 4,279 votes. Even the combined Progressive and Republican vote showed a drop of some 1,800 votes
from the 10,654 votes that Taft received in 1908. 32
Roosevelt, apparently, managed to retain support of the white
and possibly a portion of the Negro progressive Republican factions in Florida, but the vast majority of progressives in Florida
preferred to work within the Democratic Party. These men admired Wilson’s program in New Jersey, whereas Roosevelt’s progressivism was spotty.
Aside from showing part of the confusion and corruption
inherent in all Florida political organizations during the early
decades of the twentieth century, the 1912 struggle between
Taft and Roosevelt factions in the state illustrated the general
lack of consideration or enthusiasm for the Negro cause on the
part of either Republicans or the short-lived Progressive Party.
By 1912, it was not the Joe Lee type of Negro politician, but
rather the Alston type, that was increasing in number in the
South. True, the Democratic Party of the South, exemplified in
Florida by Goveror Albert W. Gilchrist, seemingly was indifferent to problems of the Negro. But the almost total disregard of
Negro rights by the Republican Party and its Progressive offshoot
in 1912, in the North as well as the South, motivated some of
the more vigorous Negroes to switch to the Democratic Party.
31. Ibid., August 13, 1912.
32. Report of the Secretary of State, 1908 (Tallahassee, 1909; ibid., 1912
(Tallahassee, 1913). Votes were cast for individual electors rather
than for entire slates.
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Individual Negro leaders of that day, like C. H. Alston of Florida,
were to be the harbingers of a mass conversion of colored voters
to the Democratic Party which would take place a generation
later, under the New Deal program off Theodore’s more liberal
cousin, Franklin Delano Roosevelt.
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